Iowa’s
Unique Take on Acquiescence
I first encountered the statute in question, Title XV, Subtitle 5, Chapter 650
of the Iowa code, as I was preparing for a conference in Ames, Iowa. Chapter
650 deals with several areas of boundary law as the title indicates: “Disputed
Boundaries and Corners.” I am not going to discuss the whole chapter, only the
two sections dealing with the doctrine of acquiescence. § 650.6 and § 650.14 provide
as follows, respectively:
Either the plaintiff or defendant may, by proper plea, put in issue the fact
that certain alleged boundaries or corners are the true ones, or that such have
been recognized and acquiesced in by the parties or their grantors for a period
of ten consecutive years, which issue may be tried before commission is
appointed, in the discretion of the court.
If it is found that the boundaries and corners alleged to have been recognized
and acquiesced in for ten years have been so recognized and acquiesced in, such
recognized boundaries and corners shall be permanently established.
I did not yet know the background story, but two things struck me at first
blush.
The first is that Iowa
had codified the doctrine of acquiescence. I was a bit disturbed by this fact.
If other states have done this, I’m unaware of it. Keep in mind that any
boundary determination is a two-part question-and-answer session. The first question
is, What is the boundary? This is the legal question that is usually answered
by way of the client’s deed.[1] The second question is, Where is the boundary
located? This is the factual question that is the primary function of the land
surveyor. Acquiescence, like almost all of the other boundary establishment
doctrines,[2] is a court-made establishment doctrine that answers the factual
question as to where the boundary is located. The fact that Iowa has codified the doctrine moves it out
of the realm of court doctrine and precedence to legislative initiative (always
scary) and the interpretation of legislative intent (even scarier).
The second thing that struck me, especially in light of the Iowa cases I was
reading on the subject, is that this legislation would have a tendency to move
all property boundaries in the state to any 10-year-old fence that had been
erected between coterminous landowners. At the very least, no 10-year-old fence
in the State of Iowa
could ever be ignored by the land surveyor (in and of itself, not a bad
proposition). But a fair interpretation could also be that every boundary in
the state has moved to the 10-year-old fence regardless of the existence of
ambiguities that normally allow for extrinsic evidence to be considered and
that tend to kick-start these settlement doctrines into play. The logical
consequence is that the land surveyor truly attempting to render an opinion on
property boundaries will be forced to accept any fence older than 10 years as
the true boundary line between any two coterminous landowners. Can you say
“fence-line surveyor”?
Consider the 1980 Iowa Supreme Court ruling in the case Sille v. Shaffer:
The meaning of “acquiescence” under section 650.14 is well settled. It is the
mutual recognition by two adjoining landowners for ten years or more that a
line, definitely marked by fence or in some manner, is the dividing line
between them. Acquiescence exists when both parties acknowledge and treat the
line as the boundary. When the acquiescence persists for ten years the line
becomes the true boundary even though a survey may show otherwise and even
though neither party intended to claim more than called for by his deed.[3]
The defendant in the case, Shaffer, vehemently opposed the idea that he had
treated the fence as a boundary and not simply as a fence of convenience. His
protestations fell on deaf ears.
Contrary to the defendant’s suggestion we find that the fence during that
period was recognized as the boundary and not merely a barrier. The plaintiff
treated the property on her side of the fence as her own. She improved and
maintained the property. Her dominion over the property was well known by
defendant. Neither party treated the fence as a mere barrier to protect the
defendant’s garden[.]4
The court’s ruling almost takes on the flavor of a unilateral recognition of
the fence as opposed to a mutual recognition. Nevertheless, in most states that
recognize the doctrine, mutual recognition is implied after enough time has
passed regardless of later testimony to the contrary.
The Role of Ambiguities
In many of the states that recognize these boundary establishment doctrines,[2] there must be a dispute over the boundary location or some level of
uncertainty. Some courts have stated that if the title boundary can be located
by a land surveyor or if there was no dispute over the location of the title
boundary, the settlement doctrine in question is not applicable. Ambiguities
that are in the deed or that are revealed when an attempt is made to locate the
boundary on the ground are generally sufficient uncertainty to allow for the
doctrines to be in play.
We have held that where the owners of adjoining tracts of land know where the
true boundary line is, and with such knowledge agree that it shall be at
another place, and in accordance with such agreement erect a fence on the
agreed boundary line and there after acquiesce in such fence as marking the
boundary line for a long period of time, no boundary line by acquiescence is
thus established because without a dispute or uncertainty as to the location of
the true boundary line, the establishment of such a boundary line would have
the effect of transferring real property by parol agreement contrary to our
statute. Here the court found that there is no official or original plat or
survey by which the boundary line can be located, and the evidence shows that
the different surveyors do not agree on the location of the boundary line. This
clearly creates sufficient uncertainty on which to base a finding of a boundary
line by acquiescence.[5]
These doctrines of the law pass muster under the statute of frauds in that it
is generally recognized that no conveyance of land is taking place. As we know,
the statute of frauds requires that all conveyances of real property must be
memorialized by a written document. This is usually the deed of conveyance. This
is why another doctrine of the property law, adverse possession, is not
generally considered to be a boundary establishment doctrine but a title
doctrine. Adverse possession not only settles where the boundary is located on
the face of the Earth; it takes the extra step of conveying land to the
plaintiff (and conversely, divesting defendant of the same land) between the
record title lines and the line claimed by adverse possession. In short,
adverse possession changes “what” the boundary is (title) and determines
“where” it is located (establishment). Adverse possession is a conveyance of
land that has taken place outside of the deed.
Another significant difference between adverse possession and the boundary
establishment doctrines is that adverse possession is a statutorily driven
right and remedy. It is a right that must be asserted in court and a remedy
that can only be handed down by a court. Without a court order memorializing
the conveyance, adverse possession has not taken place even though all of the
elements may have been satisfied in the field.
The Game Changer
I went to Ames ready to discuss what I saw as
the dire consequences of the codification of acquiescence (i.e., turning Iowa land surveyors into
fence-line surveyors). However, the day before my presentation, one of the
attendees asked me if I was going to discuss Heer v. Thola.[6] At that point, I hadn’t heard of the case
(contrary to popular belief, I don’t know everything). Given a chance to download
and digest the case, I found it to be even more disturbing than the initial
codification of acquiescence.
Instead of interpreting court-made precedence on the doctrine of acquiescence,
the court (as it must under such circumstances) set about to interpret the
statute and the intent of the legislature when it enacted the code section. In
so doing, the court made at least two astonishing and disturbing findings.
First, the court treated acquiescence, as defined under the statute, as a “title
doctrine,” because, in essence, it effects a transfer of title from the record
title line to the fence. This blows right through the traditional role of
acquiescence as an establishment doctrine that settles the location of
boundaries in the face of ambiguities in the deed. It equates acquiescence to
adverse possession, a conveyance of land that has taken place outside of the
deed.
Second, and not surprising after the first revelation, is that in Iowa, only a court may
declare when acquiescence has taken place. “The language of section 650.14
suggests judicial intervention is a requirement for establishing title by acquiescence.”[7] [Emphasis mine.] Why
wouldn’t this be the case? If acquiescence has been turned into a title
doctrine, to state otherwise would be to declare that anyone could determine
when a conveyance has taken place outside of the deed.
The traditional role of the establishment doctrines is to aid in finding intent
in an ambiguous conveyance that has already taken place, not to determine that
a conveyance has taken place outside of the deed. What was intended to be an
aid and guidance to land surveyors may just be another mine in the minefield we
call surveying. “The best laid plans of mice and men….”
References
1. By this I mean a proper
interpretation of the client’s deed. This involves reading the client’s deed in
light of surrounding circumstances and perhaps through extrinsic evidence,
especially when ambiguities create the proper atmosphere for such
consideration. I have discussed this on many occasions and will not repeat all
of the principles for the interpretation of written documents at this time.
2. Any list of boundary
establishment doctrines includes acquiescence, practical location, oral
agreement, estoppel, acquiescence and repose.
3. Sille v. Shaffer, 297 N.W.2d 379, 381 (Iowa 1980).
4. Id.
5. Jensen v. Bartlett,
286 P.2d 804, 805, 806 (Utah
1955).
6. Heer v. Thola, 613 N.W.2d 658 (Utah 2000).
7. Id. at
661.
Neither the author nor POB
intend this column to be a source of
legal advice for surveyors or their clients. The law changes and differs in
important respects for different jurisdictions. If you have a specific legal
problem, the best source of advice is an attorney admitted to the bar in your
jurisdiction.
This column is a forum for analysis and discussion of closed court cases. Facts
and information cited are limited to what is contained in the published legal
documents. It is not POB nor the author’s intent to re-try cases that have already
been resolved and closed by the court system.
By: Richard Schaut
Posted: May 12, 2010 11:47 AM
" In real property law, the transfer of the property and possession of lands, tenaments, or other things, from one person to another. The term is particularly applied to absolute conveyances of real property. The voluntary and complete transfer from one person to another. Disposition by will. Every mode of passing realty by the act of the party, as distinguished from passing it by the operation of law. See also Restraint on alienation."
The 'Every mode of passing realty by the acts of the party, ...' needs to be recognized and the statute of frauds has recognized exceptions for these acts by the owners of the land.
The only thing necessary to comply with the statute of frauds is for the owner and surveyor to create a correction document and place that on the record.
Richard Schaut